ABSTRACT Double compression detection is of great significance to recover the compression history of suspicious videos and help analyzers locate tampering points in forged videos. However, the lack of efficient methods still haunts researchers when it comes to double HEVC compression detection with a shifted group of pictures (GOP) structures. To tackle this problem, we first analyze the properties of re-encoded frames in double compressed HEVC videos. It is found that the abnormal statistics of prediction unit (PU) types in relocated I-frames can be used as the clue to expose double compression. Relocated I-frames are re-encoded P-frames, which were I-frames in the first compression. Different from the existing works, we designed the GOP-based features instead of frame-based features, enabling more efficient utilization of temporal variation patterns of PU-type statistics within each GOP unit. In the proposed method, the ratio of I-PUs and S-Pus is first computed to construct PU sequences for each GOP unit. The three-tap median filter is applied to PU sequences in order to mitigate the influence of various video contents. Several first-order statistics, including average, variation, and maximum/minimum, are selected to generate a 6-D detection feature. Then, multi-layer perceptron (MLP) is used to classify GOP-based features. Finally, the score fusion strategy is applied to obtain the detection result of the input video. Several publicly available YUV sequences are used to construct the double compression dataset with various coding parameters. In experiments, the proposed method outperforms several state-of-the-art methods under different settings of bitrates and GOP structures. The proposed method has more robust detection capability even when tampered videos are generated by combining two video clips with different GOP sizes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of video transmission techniques and video sharing websites, digital video has become one of the most widely-used ways to deliver information over the Internet. People can capture or access digital videos anywhere anytime with mobile devices. However, forgers can exploit sophisticated video editing software to change video contents easily. When tampered videos are illegally used as digital evidence in the judicial investigation, they might lead to serious consequences. Since the tampered videos must undergo the recompression process, detection of double compression can be regarded as the first step of video forensics.
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Over the past decade, researchers in the forensics community have proposed several methods to detect video double compression [1] . These methods can be divided into two categories according to whether the GOP structures in the original and secondary compression are the same or not. In video coding standards, the structure of GOP specifies the order in which intra-coded frames (I-frames) and inter-coded frames (e.g. Predicted Frames, P-frames) are arranged. I-frames are compressed independently while P-frames can use data from reference frames to achieve higher compression rate than I-frames. The first frame in each GOP unit is I-frame.
For double compression with the same GOP structure, there are several successful detection methods. Researchers extended double JPEG detection methods to solve this problem, since recompressed I-frames in MPEG videos have similar properties of double JPEG compression. In [2] - [6] , statistical features are extracted from the distributions of quantized DCT coefficients in I-frames to expose double compression. The first digit law is applied to distinguish double compressed MPEG videos in [7] , [8] . A.V. Subramanyam and Sabu Emmanuel [9] adopted the estimation theory to detect double quantization. The Markov statistics and its extended version in [10] , [11] are used to detect double compression and achieve promising detection performance. It is more challenging for double compression when all coding parameters (including compression quality, GOP structure and so on) in the re-encoding process are identical to the settings in the first compression process. Researchers found out the variation tendencies of the states of coding data (such as macroblock type and quantized DCT coefficient) after once or more recompression processes can be used to expose this kind of double compression traces [12] - [14] . In [15] , Xinghao Jiang et. al. proposed a detection framework based on quality degradation mechanisms for different video coding standards, including MPEG-2/4 and H.264. For the most advanced video compression standard, namely HEVC [16] , the statistics of several coding data, such as DCT coefficient, PU type and TU (Transform Unit) partition types, are used to construct detection features and combined with the machine-learning based classifier to get detection results [17] - [20] .
For double compression with shifted GOP structures, most existing methods applied different measurement sequences to expose the periodic occurrence of relocated I-frames in double compressed videos. Relocated I-frames denote recompressed P-frames which were I-frames in the first compression. In [2] , [21] , [22] , the average prediction residual sequence and its modified version are used as the measurement sequences. In [23] , the variation of macroblock prediction types caused by double compression is calculated to locate the positions of relocated-frames. Other kinds of measurements in the decompression domain are proposed to expose abnormal traces left by this kind of double compression, such as block artifacts [24] , [25] . After the extraction of measurement sequences, periodic analysis methods in the temporal domain or frequency domain are applied to obtain final detection results. In [26] [29] ) classifier to expose double compressed videos with fake bit rates.
In this paper, we focus on detection of double compression with shifted GOP structures, since temporal tampering operations, such as frame deletion and frame insertion [30] , [31] , can leave this kind of double compression traces in most cases. In previous works, researchers mostly treat the whole input video or individual frames as detection units (referred to as sequence-based method and frame-based method respectively). For sequence-based methods, a feature value (e.g. average prediction residual) is first extracted from each frame in compression or decompression domains. Then, a feature sequence is constructed for the input video. Finally, a periodic analysis method is applied to this feature sequence and obtains the final detection result. The main limitation of sequence-based methods is that they require some strong assumptions about the properties of double compression traces. For example, in [2] , [21] - [25] , [27] , the authors assumed that GOP structures in single and double compression are identical and fixed. Thus, relocated I-frames occur periodically in the double compressed video. However, in practical applications, the encoder may employ the adaptive GOP algorithm, causing the destruction of the periodic property of recompression traces mentioned above. For frame-based methods, detection features are extracted from individual frames [26] . Then, a classifier is trained to identify relocated I-frames. Finally, frame-wise detection results are fused to get the final detection result. The main limitation of frame-based methods is that they extract detection features from individual frames separately and cannot utilize the temporal information properly. For example, temporal correlation between adjacent frames in the same GOP unit cannot be leveraged.
To overcome these limitations, we first theoretically analyze the statistics of PU type in single and double compressed videos. It is found that the temporal variation patterns of PU type have distinguishable properties within GOP units, which inspired us to design detection features from each GOP unit instead of individual frames or the entire video sequence like previous works. In the proposed detection method, we first extract three types of PUs from the input video bitstream. The ratio of different PU types is calculated to generate the PU sequence for each GOP unit. Then, a three-tap median filter is applied to PU sequences aiming at mitigating the influence of various video contents. Several first-order statistical measurements are applied to extract GOP-based detection features in each GOP unit. The GOP-based detection features are fed into a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) classifier to obtain the output score. Finally, a score fusion strategy based on ''Average Rule'' is applied to all output scores of GOP-based features to get the detection result of the input video. Several publicly available YUV sequences are collected to construct the video double compression dataset. Extensive experiments are conducted to verify the superiority of the proposed detection scheme compared with several state-of-the-art methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, theoretical analysis of PU type statistic and its temporal variation pattern in double HEVC compression with shifted GOP structures is conducted. Section III presents details of the proposed detection scheme. In Section IV, the performance of the proposed method is evaluated and compared with several state-of-the-art methods. Besides, the robustness against more complicated double compression operations is investigated. Section V draws the conclusion and discusses the future works.
II. ANALYSIS OF PU TYPE STATISTIC AND ITS TEMPORAL VARIATION PATTERN IN DOUBLE COMPRESSED HEVC VIDEOS
In this section, the HEVC coding standard and the generation process of double compressed HEVC videos are first briefly introduced. Then, PU type statistic and its temporal variation pattern in double HEVC compression are theoretically and experimentally analyzed.
A. HEVC CODING STANDARD
HEVC standard [16] is designed to address several trends in the digital videos industry, such as the rise of high-resolution videos and the continuing improvements on the processing capacity of mobile devices. Similar to previous video coding standards (such as H.264), HEVC employs the hybrid coding architecture, including inter-/intra-prediction and 2-D transform coding aided by motion estimation/compensation. There are several advanced techniques introduced in the HEVC standard. For example, coding tree unit (CTU) which is analogous to macroblock structure in previous standards is the core of the coding layer in HEVC. The CTU consists of a luminance coding tree block (CTB), the corresponding chrominance CTBs and syntax elements. The size L × L of a luminance CTB can be chosen as L = 16, 32, or 64 samples. An example of CTU, partitioning and processing order is presented in Fig. 1 . The CTU is further split into multiple CUs (Coding Unit) using a quad tree (denoted as the coding tree), which aims to adapt to various local characteristics.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the size of this CTU is 64 × 64 and minimum CU size is 8 × 8, where each CU has an associated partitioning into prediction units (PUs) and transform units (TUs). Thus, each CU contains one or more PUs. The PUs works as the basic representative block for sharing prediction information. In each PU, the same prediction process is used and relevant information is transmitted to the decoder. There are three main types of PUs, including skip mode (S-PU), intra mode (I-PU) and inter mode (P-PU). In this work, the statistics of PUs are applied to expose the traces of double compressed HEVC videos.
B. DOUBLE HEVC COMPRESSION OPERATION
In real forensics cases, if attackers want to edit the video contents, they have to conduct the following procedures. First, the source video is decompressed into frames. Then, video editing software is applied to modify the contents in target regions or video clips. Finally, the tampered frame sequence is re-encoded with a lossy compression format. Consequently, the tampered video must undergo the compression processes at least twice. Besides, the original GOP structure is destroyed in most cases due to the following reasons: 1) the inter-frame forgery operation may delete or insert several frames; 2) the default GOP structure used by the video editing software may be different from that used to compress the original video.
Let us consider the following case to illustrate the properties of single compressed videos and double compressed videos more intuitively. The raw video sequence (denoted as F = {F 1 , . . . , F T }, where T denotes the total number of frames in the input video) is first encoded with the GOP size G 1 and the bitrate B 1 to generate the single compressed video (denoted as V s ). For simplicity, B-frames are not considered in this work. The calculation of prediction residuals in the inter-coding process of P-frames in V s can be formulated as:
whereF (s) t denotes the tth decompressed frame after sth compression; P (s) t denotes the prediction residual of the tth frame in sth compression; M (·, ·) denotes the motion compensation process. In single compressed videos, the strength of differences between the current frame and its reconstructed reference frame (e.g. F t−1 andF (1) t−2 ) depends on two factors: 1) the variation of video contents. 2) the error propagation through a GOP unit due to the motion compensation. In most cases, video contents vary smoothly between two adjacent frames especially for background regions due to the high temporal sampling rate of digital videos (e.g. 25fps). Besides, the error propagation caused by motion compensation makes the correlation of prediction residuals in adjacent P-frames become higher in the same GOP unit. Therefore, the fluctuation of coding data in the compression domain between adjacent two P-frames belonging to the same GOP unit is slight for single compressed videos.
Then, the single compressed video is decompressed and re-encoded with the GOP size G 2 and the bitrate B 2 , where
There are two kinds of P-frames in double compressed videos with shifted GOP structures, namely P-P frames (original P-frames re-encoded as P-frames) and relocated I-frames (original I-frames re-encoded as P-frames). As shown in Fig. 2 , the (t − 1)th frame and the tth frame are P-P frame and relocated I-frame respectively. The recompression operation can be formulated as follows:
It can be observed that the tth frame and its reference frames belong to different GOP units in the single compression process. Therefore, the error propagation caused by motion compensation in the (t − 1)th frame has weak correlation to the tth frame, which leads to the abnormal increment of the difference between the (t −1)th and tth frames. Consequently, the fluctuations of coding data between the relocated I-frame and its reference P-P frame become larger in the same GOP unit during the re-encoding process. In the next section, how the increment of differences between relocated I-frames and their reference P-P frames influences the statistics of PU types and its temporal variation pattern will be investigated.
C. PU TYPE STATISTIC AND ITS TEMPORAL VARIATION PATTERN IN DOUBLE HEVC COMPRESSED VIDEOS
As mentioned in Section II-A, several types of PUs are allowed in P-frames to improve compression efficiency in HEVC standard, including I-PU, S-PU and P-PU. If the magnitude of prediction residuals is too large, the HEVC encoder would prefer to apply I-PU (which is encoded independently without the reference frame) instead of P-PU. This indicates that relocated I-frames, which contain abnormal increment of differences between their reference frames, are more likely to contain the larger number of I-PUs than their adjacent P-P frames. Besides, due to the increment of difference between relocated I-frames and their reference frames, the ratio of S-PUs in relocated I-frames drops dramatically. To illustrate the properties of I-PUs and S-PUs more intuitively, an example is provided in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . In this example, we randomly select a part of the YUV sequence ''KristenAndSara'' (denoted as Y) to generate the single compressed HEVC video (V s ) and the double compressed HEVC video (V d ). More details about YUV sequences can be found in Section IV. V s is generated by encoding Y with GOP size G 2 and bitrate B 2 . V d is generated by first encoding Y with GOP size G 1 and bitrate B 1 . Then, this single compressed video is decompressed and re-encoded with GOP size G 2 and bitrate B 2 . G 1 and G 2 are set as 5 and 20 respectively while B 1 and B 2 are both set as 800kbps. The ratio of S-PUs and I-PUs in P-frames are calculated from the single and double compressed videos respectively. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , dashed lines divide the sequence of PUs' ratio into different sub-sequences which belong to individual GOP units. The red numbers in figures denote the indexes of GOP units. For the single compressed video as shown in Fig. 3 , the sub-sequences of S-PUs' and I-PUs' ratio belonging to individual GOP units have the smooth variation tendency except for some small fluctuations caused by moving objects. On the other hand, for the double compressed video, the subsequences of S-PUs' and I-PUs' ratio belonging to individual GOP units contain distinct fluctuations as shown in Fig. 4 , such as peaks and villages due to the occurrence of relocated I-frames. These distinguishable temporal variation patterns of S-PUs' and I-PUs' ratio sub-sequences between single and double compressed HEVC videos inspired us to design GOP-based detection features instead of treating frames separately. In this way, the temporal information in GOP units can be leveraged more efficiently to identify double HEVC compression with shifted GOP structures. 
III. THE PROPOSED DOUBLE HEVC COMPRESSION DETECTION SCHEME USING GOP-BASED PU TYPE STATISTICS
Based on the distinguishable temporal variation patterns of PU types between single and double compressed videos, we proposed a detection framework of double HEVC compressed videos using GOP-based PU type statistics as shown in Fig. 5 . It consists of four main steps, including data preprocessing, GOP-based feature extraction, classification using the MLP classifier and score fusion based on ''Average Rule''. In this section, details of each step will be illustrated point by point.
A. DATA PREPROCESSING Firstly, coding parameters are extracted from the video bitstream. During the decoding process, the numbers of S-PUs, I-PUs and P-PUs are counted over each frame to form the sequence s(t), i(t) and p(t), where t denotes the index of the frame and t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. In videos free from tampering attacks, video contents change slightly between two adjacent frames in most cases leading to the smooth variation of PU numbers without any abrupt changes. In this work, the ratio of S-PUs and I-PUs is considered instead of the number of PUs, since the numbers of different PUs vary dramatically with different video contents. For example, S-PUs become dominant among three different PUs types in static-background videos, while they rarely occur in videos containing global motion. The ratio of S-PUs and I-PUs can be calculated as follows:
where R s (t) and R i (t) are in the range of [0, 1]. To further mitigate the influence of various video contents to R s (t) and R i (t), the 3-tap median filter operation is applied to enhance the abnormal disturbances caused by double compression. This operation can be formulated as follows:
The residual by subtracting the median element among neighbors will be used to calculate detection features in next step. For I-PUs,R i (t) can be obtained in the similar way as Eq. 5.
B. EXTRACTION OF DETECTION FEATURES USING GOP-BASED PU TYPE STATISTICS
According to the analysis provided in Section II-C, the temporal variation patterns of PU types are distinguishable between GOP units with and without relocated I-frames, which can be regarded as clues to identify double compressed videos. To expose the temporal abnormal traces of double compressed videos, we propose the GOP-based detection features using PU types statistics in this work. In the design of GOP-based features, the following issues should be considered carefully. First, the structure of GOP in the suspicious video may vary in a wide range. Second, the analyzer is blind to the original encoding information meaning that the number of relocated I-frames in each GOP unit is unknown. Considering above-mentioned issues, we propose the detection features leveraging GOP-based PU type statistics as follows: According to the process in Section III-A, two filtered PU sequences can be obtained from each GOP unit, including the filtered I-PU sequence, referred to as I = {R i (t k + 1) , . . . ,R i (t k + G k )} (where t k denotes the index of the first frame in the kth GOP unit and G k denotes the size of the kth GOP unit) and the filtered S-PU sequence, referred to as S = {R s (t k + 1) , . . . ,R s (t k + G k )}.
For I, according to the analysis in Section II-C and the observation in Fig. 4 , the ratio of I-PUs in relocated frames increases distinctly compared with that in other kinds of P-frames. Therefore, the following first-order statistics of the kth GOP unit are considered: 1) the mean value of elements in I:
2) The variation value of elements in I:
3) The maximum value of elements in I:
For S, based on the analysis in Section II-C, the ratio of S-PUs in relocated frames decreases compared to other kinds of P-frames in most cases. Therefore, the mean and the variation of S is calculated in the same way as Eq.6 and Eq. 7 respectively. Besides, the minimum value of S is considered, namely R s,min = min n {R s (t k + n)}, n ∈ {1, . . . , G k }. Finally, the 6-D detection feature for a GOP unit can be obtained, namely:
To illustrate the statistical differences between GOP-based detection features of single compressed HEVC videos (f s ) and double compressed HEVC videos (f d ), the t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) technique [32] is applied to conduct dimension reduction of f s and f d to the 2-D plane. Samples of the training set (more details can be found in Section IV-A) is used. As shown in Fig. 6 , the projected versions of f s and f d can be roughly divided into two groups. However, there remains some overlapping regions between f s and f d . It infers that the non-linear classifier should be applied to classify f s and f d properly, enabling more robust detection performance.
C. MULTI-LAYER PERCEPTRON CLASSIFIER
To classify GOP-based detection features efficiently, the widely-used supervised learning algorithm, namely Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP), is applied to automatically learn a non-linear mapping φ(·) : R l → R m , where l is the dimension of the input data and m is the number of classes. The output of MLP can be regarded as a vector, which denotes the probabilities of input data belonging to each class. MLP can learn φ(·) for classification using a set of training samples and their corresponding labels (referred to as
where N is the number of training samples. There can be one or more non-linear layers (also called as hidden layer) between the input and the output layers.
In our detection framework, we propose an MLP classifier with the following architecture. The number of nodes in the input layer is set as 6, which is equal to the dimension of the proposed GOP-based detection feature. The number of hidden layers is set as 2, considering both time efficiency and detection performance. The number of nodes in each hidden layer is set as 32 experimentally. The Sigmoid function is used as the non-linear activation function in hidden layers. Finally, the number of nodes in the output layer is set as 2, one for positive samples (GOP units containing relocated I-frames) and one for negative samples (GOP units without relocated I-frames). The Mean Square Error loss is used to optimize the MLP classifier with the back-propagation algorithm.
D. SCORE FUSION BASED ON ''AVERAGE RULE''
After previous steps, the MLP classifier can obtain the output vector ([p(H 0 |x), [p(H 1 |x)]), where hypotheses H 0 and H 1 denote the input sample x extracted from the GOP unit containing relocated I-frames and the GOP unit without relocated I-frames respectively. Then, p(H 0 |x) is used as detection score for each GOP unit. For a suspicious video, output scores of all GOP units are collected as F = {p(H 0 |x 1 ), . . . , p(H 0 |x N g )}, where N g denotes the number of GOP units in the suspicious video. In the final step, the score fusion strategy is conducted over F to achieve the detection result of the suspicious video. In our problem, the fusion of GOP-based output scores faces the following challenges: 1) The value of N g varies among different videos depending on the setting of GOP size. 2) The video contents among different GOP units may be various. Therefore, we selected the ''Average Rule'' (
p(H 0 |x j )) to get the final detection result of the input video. This score fusion procedure can be regarded as a local-to-global strategy to obtain video-wise detection results, which can make the proposed detection framework more flexible to different types of double compressed videos.
IV. EXPERIMENTS A. DATASET
In experiments, thirteen 1080p YUV sequences and thirteen 720p YUV sequences are collected from the Internet to generate the dataset of double HEVC compression. Details of these YUV sequences are provided in the Appendix, including the list of video names and the download link. To unify the VOLUME 7, 2019 spatial resolution of different raw video sequences, 1080p YUV sequences are first resized to 1280×720 (720p) in the spatial domain. Please note this process does not introduce any traces of lossy compression. Each YUV sequence is further split into non-overlapping raw video clips containing 100 frames. Consequently, 127 raw video clips are obtained. To generate single compressed videos, raw video clips are encoded with the GOP size G 2 and the bit rate B 2 . On the other hand, to generate double compressed videos, raw video clips are first encoded with the GOP size G 1 and the bit rate B 1 . Then, these single compressed videos are decompressed and re-encoded with the GOP size G 2 and the bit rate B 2 . B 1 and B 2 are both selected from {800, 1000, 1200, 1400}kbps. The values of GOP sizes G 1 and G 2 are selected from {5, 10, 17} and {12, 15, 20} respectively. The x265 1 is selected as the HEVC codec in experiments. The Main Profile is applied in the coding process. For simplicity, B-frames are not considered. Other parameters are set as default. Finally, we can obtain 1524 (= 127×3×4) single compressed videos and 18288 (= 127×3×4×3×4) double compressed videos.
All video samples are divided into two groups for training and testing respectively according to the YUV sequences. 2 It ensures that single and double compressed videos belonging to one YUV sequence are never included in both the training and the testing set. Finally, GOP-based detection features are extracted from video samples. There are 5852 negative feature samples and 70162 positive feature samples in the training phase. Positive feature samples are randomly downsampled to 5852, which aims at balancing the numbers of positive and negative samples. Eventually, 5852 pairs of negative and positive feature samples are used to train the MLP classifier.
B. HYPERPARAMETERS
The Resilient Propagation (referred to as RPROP) is applied to optimize the network parameters. RPROP applies a local adaptation of the weight-updates according to the behavior of the error function. This algorithm can mitigate the harmful effects of the magnitudes of the partial derivatives, especially when the activation function is ''squashing'' functions, such as sigmoid used in our MLP. The hyper-parameters in the training phase is set as follows: The learning rate is initialized as 0.001 and divided by 2 after every 10 epochs. For RPROP, we followed the settings in [33] , except that the initial update-value 0 is set as 0.9. All training samples are run once in an epoch. The training process is stopped after 30 epochs.
1 http://x265.org/ 2 YUV sequences used for the training phase includes: 720p: stockholm, KristenAndSara, Johnny, shields, vidyo3, ducks_take_off, sunflower. 1080p: rush_hour, crowd_run, rush_field_cuts, blue_sky, speed_bag, touchdown_pass, west_wind_easy, pedestrian_area, station2; YUV sequences used for the testing phase includes: 720p: in_to_tree, park_joy, old_town_cross, vidyo1, parkrun, mobcal, FourPeople. 1080p: snow_mnt, tractor, riverbed. 
where TP and TN denote the numbers of positive and negative samples which are classified correctly. FP and FN denote the numbers of positive and negative samples which are classified falsely. P and N denote the total numbers of positive and negative samples in the testing phase.
D. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS
In this experiment, we conducted comparison experiments with state-of-the-art methods, including [27] and [28] . The implementation of Xu's method and Liang's method following the settings in [27] and [28] respectively. Experimental results are shown in Table 1 . The best results are bolded. We first introduce the details of [27] and [28] as follows: * Xu et al. [27] proposed a detection scheme based on the sequence of PU modes (SN-PUPM) for double HEVC compression detection, together with estimation on GOP sizes. The number of PU with different prediction modes is firstly extracted from each frame. Then, the SN-PUPM is calculated using absolute difference values among adjacent three frames and smoothed by the twice averaging filter. Then, the SVM classifier is trained and then labels relocated I-frames. Finally, the periodic analysis method is applied to the score sequence to detect double compression and estimate GOP sizes. Xu's method assumes that GOP sizes in the first and second compressions are fixed.
* Liang et al. [28] proposed a fake bitrate video detection scheme using the histogram of PU partition features (referred to as HPP features). The PU partition information of the first P-frame in each GOP is used to extract 25-D HPP features. The detection feature is computed by averaging HPP features of all GOP units in the input video. The detection features are fed into the SVM classifier with the polynomial kernel to obtain the final detection result. It can be observed that the detection accuracy of the proposed method is higher than the results of Liang's method and Xu's method by clear margins, namely 4.08% and 7.61% respectively. The distinct improvement infers that our proposed method can provide more robust detection results due to the efficient utilization of temporal information in GOP units. Besides, the difference between TPR and TNR of the proposed method, namely 1.39%, is much smaller than that of Liang's method and Xu's method. It infers that our proposed method has more reliable detection capability for both positive and negative samples.
E. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITH DIFFERENT GOP SIZES AND BITRATES
The properties of abnormal traces caused by double compression are highly related to the GOP size and compression bitrate used in the coding process. It is significant to investigate how different GOP sizes and bitrates influence the detection performance. Since the analyzer is blind to the coding settings in the first compression, the detection method should be robust to different coding settings. In this experiment, the detection accuracies are calculated as the function of (B 1 , B 2 ) and (G 1 , G 2 ) respectively.
1) DIFFERENT BITRATES
For one combination (B 1 , B 2 ), single compressed videos encoded by B 2 and double compressed videos which are first encoded by B 1 and then re-encoded by B 2 are used as negative and positive samples respectively. Experimental results are shown in Fig. 7 As shown in Fig. 7 , the detection accuracies of the proposed method are above 90% in most cases. It demonstrates the robustness of the proposed method against different bitrates, even when the recompression bitrate is low (e.g. 800kbps). It can be observed that the detection performance becomes worse with the increment of B 1 , since the magnitude of compression artifacts gets weaker under higher compression quality (e.g. B 1 = 1400kbps). Besides, the proposed detection method outperforms Xu's method and Liang's method in all cases, which illustrates the more reliable detection capability of the proposed GOP-based feature against various bitrate settings.
2) DIFFERENT GOP SIZES
For one combination (G 1 , G 2 ), single compressed videos encoded by G 2 and double compressed videos which are first encoded by G 1 and then re-encoded by G 2 are used as negative and positive samples respectively. Experimental results are shown in Fig. 8 .
It can be observed that the detection accuracies of the proposed method are higher than 90% in most cases. The proposed method can achieve more promising results than Xu's and Liang's method under some challenging settings, where G 1 > G 2 , such as (G 1 , G 2 ) = (17, 12) and (17, 15) . In this kind of setting, quality degradation of the recompression process is more likely to destroy the traces of relocated I-frames. Besides, the performance of all methods become worse with the increment of G 1 . It is because there are less relocated I-frames in the double compressed video with the larger value of G 1 .
F. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AGAINST MORE COMPLICATED DOUBLE COMPRESSION
In practical applications, the forgers may combine two video clips to generate a tampered video. Video clips from different sources are more likely to have different GOP structures. Therefore, after video clip combination and recompression, VOLUME 7, 2019 the traces of double compression in the tampered video may not have the periodic properties considered in previous works. In our proposed method, the detection feature is extracted from GOP units and the final detection result is obtained using the score fusion strategy. Since the assumption that relocated I-frames occur periodically is not required, our method can handle this complicated situation.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method under more complicated double compression, the following experiment is conducted. In this experiment, we create tampered videos in the following manner. YUV sequences used to generate testing samples in Section IV-A are considered in this experiment. The single compressed video is encoded with the same procedure in Section IV-A. To generate a double compressed video combining two video clips, two single compressed videos with different GOP sizes are randomly selected. Then, these two videos are decoded and then recompressed with G c and B c which are selected from {12, 15, 20} and {800, 1000, 1200, 1400}kbps respectively. Other settings are identical to those in Section IV-A. Finally, we can obtain 1524 tampered videos to evaluate the detection performance. The trained MLP classifier in Section IV-D is applied to generate detection results directly.
As shown in Table 2 , the proposed method still outperforms Liang's method and Xu's method distinctly. The detection accuracy of Liang's method keeps roughly constant to that in Table 1 , since Liang's method do not set the assumption that relocated I-frames occur periodically in double compressed videos. On the other hand, the average detection accuracy of Xu's method is lower than that of the proposed method by 6.19%. Compared with the results in Section IV-D, the detection performance of the proposed method achieves some improvement. It infers that our method is robust against the combination of video clips with different GOP sizes. On the other hand, Xu's method suffered from performance degradation in this scenario, since the periodic property of relocated I-frames is destroyed due to the combination of video clips with different GOP sizes. In summary, the proposed method leveraging the temporal variation patterns has robust detection capability for more complicated double compressed videos.
G. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF DOUBLE COMPRESSED VIDEOS WITH ADAPTIVE GOP SIZE
For more advanced video compression standards, the adaptive GOP size is allowed to improve the compression efficiency and visual quality. For double compressed videos with shifted GOP structures, the adaptive GOP technique can destroy the periodic property of relocated I-frames assumed in several previous works, such as [2] , [21] , [22] , [27] . The proposed method extracts detection features from the GOP units and apply the score fusion strategy to overcome this more challenging and realistic scenario. It is significant to verify the advantage of the proposed detection scheme. In this experiment, we enable the adaptive GOP technique in the recompression procedure of double compressed videos by setting the value of the coding option ''-scenecut'' as 60 in x265. The value of ''-scenecut'' ranges from 0 to 100, where the higher value of this option means that the I-frame placement is more aggressive during the encoding process. Other experimental settings are identical to those in Section IV-D. The detection results of the proposed method and state-ofthe-art methods are presented in Table 3 .
As shown in Table 3 , the proposed method achieves the best detection accuracies in all cases. Unsurprisingly, the performance degradation of Xu's method is distinct compared with the results in Table 1 (namely 4.08%), since Xu's method assume the occurrence of relocated I-frames is periodic. The detection accuracy of Liang's method decreases slightly due to different GOP intervals in the re-encoding process. The feature construction of Liang's method only considers the first P-frame in each GOP unit, which is more sensitive to the variation of GOP sizes. Experimental results illustrate that the proposed detection framework based on GOP-based PU statistic features can achieve more reliable detection capability compared with state-of-the-art methods, even when the adaptive GOP technique is applied.
H. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF DOUBLE COMPRESSED VIDEOS WITH DIFFERENT RATE-DISTORTION OPTIMIZATION STRATEGIES
In the encoding process of digital videos, the rate-distortion optimization strategy [34] (referred to as RDO strategy) is applied to optimize the amount of distortion (loss of video quality) against the amount of data required to encode the video. Forgers may use different types of RDO strategies to conduct the encoding process. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the robustness of the proposed method under different settings of RDO strategies. In this experiment, we generate testing samples in the following manner. True bitrate and fake bitrate videos are generated using the x265 where the value of option '-rd' is set as 5 instead of the default setting used in Section IV-D. The option '-rd' determines which type of the RDO strategy is used to encode videos. The higher value of '-rd' denotes the more exhaustive analysis and more complicated strategy to achieve better visual quality. The default setting of this option is 3. Other experimental parameters are identical to those in Section IV-D. The trained MLP classifier in Section IV-D is applied to evaluate the performance directly in this experiment without any other fine-tuning.
As shown in Table 4 , the proposed method can still achieve reliable detection performance with the different RDO strategy, where the detection accuracy is 93.85%. The performance degradation compared with the results using the original RDO strategy is slight, which is less than 0.5%. It illustrates that the temporal abnormal traces are detectable under different coding parameter settings by adopting our proposed GOP-based PU type statistics features. It is important to be robust against different coding parameter settings, since those parameters are blind to analyzers in practical forensics scenarios.
I. ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT FEATURE SUBSETS AND CLASSIFIERS
In this experiment, the influence of different feature subsets and classifiers will be investigated to verify the superiority of the proposed detection scheme.
1) DIFFERENT FEATURE SUBSETS
As mentioned in Section III-B, our proposed detection features are extracted from the information of I-PUs and S-PUs. It is significant to analyze how different subsets of the feature influence the detection performance. Two subsets of detection feature are constructed, namely
The experimental procedure is the same as that in Section IV-D. Experimental results are shown in Table 5 .
As shown in Table 5 , the subsets of detection feature (f 1 and f 2 ) can achieve the promising detection results, namely 92.26% and 90.98% respectively. Moreover, the better detection accuracy can be obtained by concatenating f 1 and f 2 . It demonstrates f 1 and f 2 are complementary to each other. Besides, it should be noted that the detection accuracies of f 1 and f 2 are both higher than that of Liang's method (86.70%) and Xu's method (90.23%). This demonstrates the advantage of applying GOP-based statistical features to detect double compression. 
2) DIFFERENT TYPES OF CLASSIFIERS
In our proposed method, we applied the multi-layer perception (MLP) classifier to identify GOP units from single and double compressed HEVC videos. It is significant to verify the superiority of the MLP classifier compared with other conventional classifiers, such as Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier. The hyperparameters of the SVM classifier with linear kernel and radial basis function kernel (RBF kernel) are optimized using the five-cross validation strategy [35] . Other experimental settings are identical to those in Section IV-D. Detection results are presented in Table 6 .
As shown in Table 6 , the proposed method leveraging the MLP classifier achieves the best average detection accuracy, namely 94.31%. The SVM classifier with linear kernel has the worst performance due to the weak learning capability of the non-linearity for the proposed GOP-based features. Besides, the SVM classifier with RBF kernel still cannot achieve competitive detection performance compared with the MLP classifier, where the drop of the detection accuracy is 4.17%. Experimental results demonstrate that the advantage of applying the MLP classifier to conduct classification with the proposed GOP-based detection features.
J. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SCORE FUSION STRATEGIES
To obtain the final detection result of the input video, the fusion strategy is applied to output scores of GOP-based features. In the proposed method, ''Average Rule'' is selected as the fusion strategy (s v = Table 7 .
It can be observed that the proposed method using the score fusion based on ''Average Rule'' can achieve better detection performance. Interestingly, the difference between TPR and TNR of ''Average Rule'' (1.39%) is much smaller than that of ''Max Rule'' (6.69%). It infers that the detection method based on ''Average Rule'' has balanced detection capability for positive and negative samples, which provides more reliable detection results.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a novel detection method of double HEVC compression with shifted GOP structures using GOP-based PU type statistics. Different from existing methods, we construct detection features from each GOP unit instead of individual frames to utilize the distinguishable temporal variation patterns between single and double compressed videos. Concretely, for each GOP unit, the ratio of I-PUs and S-PUs is calculated to generate PU sequences and the three-tap median filter is used to mitigate the influence of various video contents. Then, several first-order statistics, including average, variation and maximum/minimum, are applied to extract GOP-based detection features, which can leverage temporal information within each GOP unit efficiently. Multi-Layer Perceptron is applied to conduct GOP-wise classification. Finally, the score fusion strategy based on ''Average Rule'' is used to obtain detection result for the input video. Extensive experiments are conducted on the double compression dataset consisting of diverse video contents. Experimental results illustrate the proposed features are robust and efficient under various encoding conditions. Besides, the proposed method outperforms several state-ofthe-art methods distinctly even when the tampered video is generated by combining two video clips with different GOP sizes or using the adaptive GOP technique. This superiority is important in real forensics applications. In future works, we will consider other types of coding information in HEVC standard to construct detection features, such as merge modes of PUs, which aims to obtain more powerful detection capability.
APPENDIX
All YUV sequences in this paper were obtained from the online video database: http://media.xiph.org/video/derf/.
The name list of YUV sequences is shown as follows: 720p: ducks_take_off, FourPeople, in_to_tree, Johnny, KristenAndSara, mobcal, old_town_cross, park_joy, parkrun, shields, stockholm, vidyo1, vidyo3; 1080p: blue_sky, crowd_run, pedestrian_area, riverbed, rush_field_cuts, rush_hour, snow_mnt, speed_bag, station2, sunflower, touchdown_pass, tractor, west_wind_easy.
